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INTRODUCTION
The rapid rise in the price of gasoline from just over $1 per gallon at the beginning of 2002 to over $4 per gallon by mid 2008 has renewed interest in the relationship between the price of gasoline and the demand for fuel economy in the U.S. market. Recent research on oil prices and economic activity suggests that because of improved energy efficiency, the U.S. economy as a whole is currently less sensitive to oil prices than it was prior to the 1970s oil shocks (Hooker, 1996 and Linn, 2008) . In contrast, the accelerating decline of the Detroit carmakers' market share between 2005 and 2008 suggests that vehicle producers may remain quite sensitive to oil and gasoline prices.
Many industry analysts and the popular press have noted the large decrease in sales for U.S. price of gasoline and market shares are suggestive, it needs to be recalled that fuel costs are only a fraction of the total cost of any vehicle, and that many other factors could explain these trends.
In fact, despite the attention given to the price of gasoline by the press, analysis of the extent to which increases in the price of gasoline adversely affect U.S. automakers has so far been limited.
The effect of the price of gasoline on new vehicle demand is also central to the ongoing policy debate over reducing gasoline consumption, which has emanated from concerns about global warming and reducing oil imports. 2 In 2007 In this paper, we estimate the effect of the price of gasoline on the demand for fuel economy.
We use a unique data set of monthly sales by vehicle model that spans 30 years. The data are disaggregated and of high-frequency, allowing for a simple and transparent empirical strategy that controls for unobserved consumer and vehicle characteristics. We find that the price of gasoline significantly affects the new vehicles market. Specifically, the increase in the price of gasoline from 2002-2007 explains nearly half of the decrease in the market share of U.S. firms.
Furthermore, according to our estimates, a one dollar increase in the price of gasoline would modestly increase the average fuel economy of vehicles sold, by 0.5-1 MPG.
We now discuss our empirical strategy and the relationship of the paper to the previous literature in more detail. Past research has generally not accounted for the potential correlation between the price of gasoline and unobserved consumer and vehicle characteristics. Many studies rely primarily on cross-sectional variation in the price of gasoline (e.g., Goldberg, 1998 , West, 2004 and Bento et al., 2006 , and thus depend on the questionable assumption that the price is uncorrelated with unobserved consumer preferences (Chouinard and Perloff, 2007) ; for example, it is assumed that environmentalists are no more likely to live in states with high gasoline taxes. 4 The failure to account for unobservables is particularly problematic because the direction of the resulting bias cannot be determined from economic theory; unobserved vehicle and consumer characteristics may be positively or negatively correlated with the price of
gasoline. An additional limitation of the cross-sectional analysis is that it yields an estimate of the relationship between the price of gasoline and consumer demand only for a particular point in time. Recent estimates of the elasticity of gasoline consumption with respect to the price of 4 An earlier empirical literature estimated the effect of the price of gasoline on new vehicle demand in the 1970s (see Tardiff, 1980 , for a summary). These studies have similar limitations to the more recent ones, however. For example, Boyd and Mellman (1980) find a large effect on demand using cross-sectional variation in vehicle characteristics and prices, but the study does not control for unobserved characteristics.
gasoline (e.g., Hughes et al., 2008) suggest that it has decreased in magnitude since the 1970s.
However, it is not known whether the effect of the price of gasoline on new vehicle demand has changed as well.
Furthermore, studies that employ time series methods (e.g., Small and Van Dender, 2007) only partially address these issues as they use market-level fuel economy measures and therefore do not control for unobserved characteristics at the vehicle level, such as weight and power, which are highly correlated with fuel economy. Finally, many earlier studies analyze consumer choices only among broad vehicle classes, such as small and large cars. Their results cannot be used to assess the effect of the price of gasoline on market shares of specific market segments, such as SUVs.
This paper makes several advances beyond the existing literature. First, we use a unique data set and empirical strategy. The data include monthly national dealer sales by detailed vehicle model from 1978-2007. As Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) argue, when using market-level data it is necessary to account for the potential correlation between vehicle prices, sales and unobserved vehicle and consumer characteristics. The monthly frequency of the sales data allows for a simple linear estimating equation that controls for these unobserved variables. Our empirical strategy derives from the details of automobile production, specifically the fact that unobserved vehicle characteristics do not vary over the model-year, and that consumer tastes are likely to be slow-moving and uncorrelated with monthly variation of the price of gasoline. The empirical specification exploits within model-year changes in the monthly gasoline price and vehicle sales, while controlling for unobserved characteristics.
The second contribution of this paper is that the sample period and unit of analysis allow us to investigate a number of questions about the price of gasoline and consumer demand that have not been the focus of previous work. Access to data at the vehicle model level allows us to investigate the causes of recent market trends shown in Figure 1 . This section describes the empirical strategy for estimating the effect of the price of gasoline on the demand for fuel economy. Motivated by the two questions discussed in the introduction, the causes of recent changes in market shares and the effect of the gasoline tax on average fuel economy, we are primarily interested in estimating the equilibrium effect of the price of gasoline on market shares of new vehicle models.
We begin with the following linear approximation to the reduced form relationship between vehicle characteristics, consumer characteristics and sales: Substituting jy φ into equation (1) yields:
where jt ε is a residual that includes the effect of deviations from the mean in consumer characteristics.
We now turn to unobserved consumer characteristics. Specifically, consider the distribution of the characteristics of consumers who enter the market, i.e., who purchase a vehicle at time t .
For a given month, we consider two examples of deviations from the mean of the distribution in a particular month: 1) more consumers of all types enter the market; and 2) more families with multiple children enter the market. The first case would affect all vehicle sales proportionately, which can be addressed by adding time dummies to equation (2):
The second case might affect vehicle models disproportionately. The maintained assumption is that within model-year changes in expected fuel costs are exogenous to changes in the distribution of consumer characteristics that disproportionately affect sales. This assumption is discussed in more detail below.
To estimate equation (3), it is necessary to obtain a measure of expected fuel costs: with a discount rate of r and a vehicle life ofT periods.
We assume that the price of gasoline follows a random walk, so that the expected price at any time t s > is equal to the price at time t . As a result, the expected cost of driving a specific model is proportional to the current price of gasoline, divided by the vehicle's fuel economy.
We use equation (4) to replace jt f in equation (3) and obtain the baseline estimating equation:
The dependent variable is the log sales of model j in month t . The first independent variable, referred to as dollars-per-mile, is the expected cost of driving the vehicle one mile at the time of purchase; g t P is the seasonally adjusted price of gasoline; and jy MPG is the fuel economy of model j in model-year y .
7 Section 4 describes the details of the variable construction.
The coefficient of interest isα , which is proportional to the effect on log sales of the cost of driving one mile. The parameterα is identified by time-series variation of the price of gasoline and cross-sectional variation of fuel economy. In particular, a within model-year change in the price of gasoline differentially affects expected driving costs across models. When the expected price increases, the fuel costs of a vehicle with high fuel economy increase by less than the costs of a "gas guzzler".
In addition to the monthly gasoline price variation, the inclusion of model-year intercepts is central to our empirical strategy. The model-year intercepts account for the potentially endogenous relationship among vehicle characteristics. Note that equation (5) includes the assumptions that there are no income effects and thatα is constant over time and across models, but these assumptions are relaxed below.
The identifying assumption is that within model-year changes in dollars-per-mile are exogenous to other determinants of sales, including consumer preferences. Recent evidence from the new vehicles market suggests that consumer characteristics in equation (1) Furthermore, sales and price profiles vary across market segments (e.g., compact cars), and many manufacturers have recently introduced incentives for specific models (Busse et al., 2007) . In the reduced form approach used in this paper, the variable jt ν in equation (1) includes changes in consumer characteristics that cause changes in transaction prices; we therefore assume that dollars-per-mile is exogenous to consumer characteristics and, thus, to transaction prices. The high frequency sales data allow us to control for slow-moving changes in consumer preferences or other factors; section 5.2 provides evidence in support of the exogeneity assumption.
INTERPRETATION OFα
The two motivations for estimatingα are to address how much of the changes in market shares in Figure 1 are due to the increase in the price of gasoline, and to estimate the effect of changes in the gasoline tax on average fuel economy. For example, to calculate the effect of an increase in the price of gasoline on SUV market shares, we use equation (5) (5) would control for the inward shift. The second effect is that the expected fuel costs of all vehicles increase, but by less for vehicles with high fuel economy. Consequently, ifα is negative, the demand curve of all vehicles would shift in by an additional amount, but by less for vehicles with high fuel economy. In sum, the time dummies control for the average effect of the price of gasoline on sales, andα is identified by deviations of sales relative to the mean. A negative value implies that when the price of gasoline increases, sales and market shares of vehicles with high fuel economy increase compared to vehicles with low fuel economy; the estimate ofα is independent of the average effect of the gasoline price increase, which is absorbed by the time dummies.
An additional effect of a gasoline price increase is that firms may increase the relative price of vehicles with high fuel economy. Thus, the price of gasoline may affect new vehicle prices (see Langer and Miller, 2008 , for evidence on prices), but because our interest lies in the reduced form relationship between dollars-per-mile and sales, it is not necessary to estimate the effect on vehicle prices.
The previous example assumed that the first effect is proportional for all vehicles. Jacobsen (2008) finds considerable evidence for substitution between new and used vehicles, which
suggests that the first effect may be greater for some vehicles than for others. However, Section 5.2 suggests that dollars-per-mile is uncorrelated with substitution from new to used vehicles.
The final issue regarding the interpretation ofα is that because the monthly price of gasoline and vehicle sales are used in the estimation, the estimate ofα corresponds to a short-run effect of the price of gasoline on sales. In response to a permanent change in the price of gasoline, vehicle manufacturers and dealers might adjust behavior in different ways (see Bresnahan and Ramey, 1993, and Copeland and Hall, 2005, on production and pricing decisions in the short and long run). For example, following a gasoline price increase, manufacturers could redesign vehicles to achieve higher fuel economy. It is uncertain, a priori, how much different in magnitude the short and long run responses might be; if dealer and manufacturer inventories are large, the difference could be small.
Given the data and identification strategy used in this paper, it is not possible to directly estimate the long run effect of the price of gasoline on sales. In specifications of equation (5) that include lags of dollars-per-mile and lags of the dependent variable, the coefficients on the lags are small and not statistically significant (not reported, but available upon request). However, these results are merely suggestive. We view the baseline estimate ofα as representing the short-run effect, and likely a lower bound to the long run effect. Thus, our empirical strategy is used to demonstrate a robust consumer response to a change in the price of gasoline, something that had not been previously shown in the literature.
DATA
The real price of gasoline is constructed using data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis's (5), discussed in the next section, reflect these patterns. Table 1 The 1978 Energy Tax Act required that mileage ratings be reported. Note that a previous version of the paper used a fuel economy variable constructed from Wards, rather than the EPA, but the EPA data appear to be more accurate; overall, the differences across data sources are quite small. 10 There is a sharp decline in MPG in January of 1980 because the 1970s data do not include light trucks or imports. the 1990s than in other time periods. The MPG distribution across vehicle models is fairly stable, although the share of models with high fuel economy has increased gradually over time, as shown in Figure 3 .
The last two rows in Panel A of Table 1 show dollars-per-mile and the log of model sales.
Panel B shows the standard deviations of these variables after taking first differences, which is the transformation used to estimate equation (5) . Even though this transformation removes much of the variation, considerable variation remains for both variables in all time periods.
MAIN RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR MARKET SHARES AND A GASOLINE TAX

4.1
EFFECT OF THE PRICE OF GASOLINE ON VEHICLE DEMAND OVER TIME Table 2 reports the estimate ofα in equation ( While our primary interest is in explaining the trends shown in Figure 1 as well as estimating the effect of the gasoline tax on average fuel economy, we first assess whetherα has changed over time. If it has, we would restrict our sample to the most recent time period to answer the questions of interest; alternatively, ifα has been fairly stable, using a longer sample period would increase the efficiency of the estimate. Column 3 of Table 2 reports a specification that demonstrates more succinctly the changing pattern of consumer responsiveness to the price of gasoline over time. The sample period is separated into five six-year intervals, beginning in 1978. The table reports the interaction of dollars-per-mile with a set of time period dummies. Note that there is no omitted time period in this specification, so each coefficient should be interpreted as the response during the corresponding period. The results suggest that consumer demand responds to the price of gasoline when the price is high or increasing, i.e., in the late 1970s/early 1980s and in the 2000s.
In fact, the response turns out to be quantitatively similar during these times. 11 The price of gasoline had a negligible effect on sales when it was low and relatively stable in the intervening years. As in Figure 4 , the coefficient estimate is weakly positive in the early 1990s, but the magnitude is smaller than in the first and last periods and the standard errors are much larger. 12 Because we are interested in understanding recent changes in market shares and the effect of a future increase in the gasoline tax, in the remaining analysis we restrict the sample to the most recent time period (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) . This specification is reported in column 4, and is considered the baseline in the following discussion. At the same time, market shares of U.S. manufacturers, which rely on sales of large vehicles, declined by 20 percent. It is unclear, though, how much of the changes in market shares is related to the change in the price of gasoline. 11 It is possible that the CAFE standard biases the results. A permanent increase in the price of gasoline would relax the constraint imposed by the standard because consumers would shift towards vehicles with high fuel economy. Firms may respond by reducing the relative prices of vehicles with low fuel economy, which would mitigate the effect of the gasoline price increase on sales. The dampening effect may be larger in the first time period, when the CAFE standards were first phased in, than in the more recent period. We use a reduced form approach to address this possibility. Vehicle type distinguishes cars from light trucks. Because the standards apply at the firm-type-year level, we estimate a specification that includes firm-type-month interactions. The results of this exercise are nearly identical to the reported results. 12 Small and Van Dender (2007) and Hughes et al. (2008) provide evidence that the short and long run own price elasticity of gasoline consumption has decreased in magnitude over the past 30 years. The elasticity can be decomposed into three effects: the elasticity of miles travelled with respect to the gasoline price; the price elasticity of the size of the vehicle stock; and the price elasticity of the average fuel economy of the stock. The results reported in Small and Van Dender (2007) indicate that the decrease in the own price elasticity of consumption is due to a decrease in the price elasticity of miles traveled. The results in our paper are thus not inconsistent with the previous studies.
EFFECT OF THE PRICE OF GASOLINE ON MARKET SHARES OF U.S. FIRMS AND SUVS
To We find that the increase of $1.11 per gallon caused nearly half of the decrease in the market share of large SUVs, but much less of the increase in the market share of small SUVs. 13 In calculating the effect of the price increase on the market share of U.S. automakers, we find that half of its decline can be explained by the increase in the price of gasoline. We conclude that the price of gasoline has a substantial effect on the new vehicles market, although perhaps smaller than some analysts have recently suggested. 13 The price of gasoline affects sales in relation to the difference between a vehicle model's fuel economy and the average fuel economy in the sample. The smaller effect on small SUVs is due to the fact that the fuel economy of small SUVs is similar to the average fuel economy of models in the sample. A change in the price of gasoline therefore has a small effect on the market share of small SUVs.
EFFECT OF A GASOLINE TAX INCREASE ON AVERAGE FUEL ECONOMY
We now relate our model to the economic policy issue of reducing gasoline consumption. The public debate has focused on raising the CAFE standard, a command-and-control type regulation that applies to new vehicles sold. Many economists, however, have argued that raising the gasoline tax instead would be a more efficient way of reducing the consumption of gasoline. A welfare comparison of the two policies depends partly on consumer demand for fuel economy (Austin and Dinan, 2005) . Equation (5) estimates precisely this.
We use the estimate ofα to calculate the change in average fuel economy of new vehicles due to a one dollar increase in the price of gasoline, starting from the fuel economy observed in August of 2007. The first column of Table 3 reports the difference between the counterfactual and actual sales-weighted MPG for the baseline specification in column 4 of Table 2 . The standard error is reported in parentheses, calculated using the delta method. 14 The estimate ofα implies that a one dollar price increase would raise average fuel economy by 1.08 MPG, which is significant at the one percent level. The elasticity of average fuel economy with respect to the price of gasoline is therefore about 0.12, which is roughly one-half of that reported by Austin and Dinan.
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
ALTERNATIVE ESTIMATION MODELS
As noted above, equation (5) includes several functional form assumptions. Columns 2 and 3 of Table 3 report the estimated effect of a one dollar price increase on average fuel economy using alternate estimation models that relax the main functional form assumptions in equation (5) .
Equation (5) Table 3 uses the estimated coefficients from this specification to estimate that a one dollar increase in the price of gasoline increase raises average fuel economy by 1.20 MPG. This effect is significant at the 5 percent level and is quite similar to the baseline estimate shown in column 1.
Finally, we estimate an aggregate regression that characterizes the effect of the price of gasoline on average fuel economy:
The dependent variable is the log of the monthly sales-weighted average MPG of all new vehicles and the first independent variable is the log monthly price of gasoline. The regression includes month and year dummies and the coefficientδ is the elasticity of average MPG to the price of gasoline. The advantage of this specification is thatδ is simple to interpret, as a linear approximation to the effect of the price of gasoline on average MPG. On the other hand, the results cannot be used to answer questions pertaining to the effect of the price of gasoline on market shares of U.S. automakers and SUVs. Nevertheless, using observations from 2002-2007, we estimate equation (7) for comparison with the results reported earlier and with the previous literature. The estimate ofδ is 0.063 with standard error 0.015, which is significant at the one percent level. It implies that a one percent increase in the price of gasoline raises average fuel economy by 0.06 percent. A one dollar increase in the price of gasoline raises average fuel economy by 0.51 MPG (column 3 of Table 3 ), which is smaller than many estimates in the literature.
ADDITIONAL SPECIFICATIONS
The preceding sections have documented a strong relationship between the price of gasoline and consumer demand for fuel economy. We report several additional specifications that address potential omitted variables bias.
The motivation for using dollars-per-mile as a measure of fuel costs is that under a random walk assumption, the current price of gasoline is proportional to expected fuel costs. We can relax this assumption for part of the sample period by using the 6-month crude oil futures price instead of the current price of gasoline. The results are reported in column 1 of Table 4 , and
show that the coefficient is negative and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The smaller magnitude reflects the greater volatility of the variable during the sample period; using the results from this specification, the implications for the effect of the price of gasoline on market shares turn out to be similar to the baseline specification.
The baseline specification uses the seasonally adjusted price of gasoline. We view this as the appropriate measure because consumers are not likely to treat all price increases equally; for example, the price of gasoline tends to be higher during the summer months than during other months and a price increase between spring and summer is not necessarily a signal of an increase in the future price. As a robustness check, column 2 uses the actual real price of gasoline rather than the seasonally adjusted price. The results are nearly identical to the baseline.
In the baseline specification we assume that dollars-per-mile is exogenous to other timevarying determinants of sales, including consumer characteristics. Sufficiently detailed data are not available to control for these variables. However, if the distribution of consumer characteristics were correlated with dollars-per-mile, it is likely that the omitted variables would be correlated among vehicles that belong to the same market segment. For example, if large and wealthy families tend to purchase vehicles in the winter, market shares of all SUVs would probably be greater in the winter.
We provide evidence supporting the exogeneity assumption in columns 3-5. close to the baseline, although it is smaller in column 5. We conclude that the only threat to the empirical strategy would be an omitted variable that has a large effect on sales, yet is weakly correlated within a market segment. The robustness to alternative definitions of market segments suggests that this is unlikely.
CONCLUSION
This paper estimates the effect of the price of gasoline on the demand for fuel economy. The empirical strategy combines time series variation of the price of gasoline with cross-sectional variation of fuel economy, exploiting the fact that the effect on fuel costs of a given price change is inversely proportional to fuel economy. We control for unobserved characteristics that vary by model-year by using monthly sales and gasoline price data, combined with model-year fixed effects. We find the price of gasoline to have a significant effect on the demand for fuel (5) by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). The dependent variable is the log share of sales by model and month. All variables are in first differences in columns 2-4. All specifications include month dummies and column 1 includes model-year interactions. Columns 1, 2 and 4 report the estimated coefficient on dollars-permile, which is constructed as in Table 1 . Column 3 reports the interaction of dollars-per-mile with a set of dummy variables, which are equal to one in the indicated model-years. Specification Column (4) of Table 2 Column (1), with Separate Coefficient by Model-Year Equation (7) Notes: Each column reports the effect of a one dollar increase in the price of gasoline on average MPG. The effects are calculated from the indicated specifications, which use observations from model-year [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] . Column 1 uses the same specification as column 4 of Table 2 . Column 2 uses the same specification as column 1, except that a separate coefficient on the dollars-per-mile variable is estimated for each model-year. Column 3 reports the results of estimating equation (7). In columns 1 and 2, the calculation uses the predicted market shares of models sold in August, 2007, with and without the price increase. The standard error is in parentheses, calculated using the delta method. The effect of the price increase in column 3 is the change in average miles per gallon if the price increases by one dollar, relative to the price in August, 2007. Table 2 . Column 1 uses the 6-month futures price of crude oil in place of the current price. Column 2 uses the actual gasoline price in place of the seasonally adjusted price. Models are assigned quintiles based on their fuel economy. Columns 3-5 report the same specification as column 4 of Table 2 but with additional controls. Column 3 includes calendar month-MPG quintile interactions. Column 4 includes calendar month-vehicle class interactions. Column 5 includes timevehicle class interactions.
